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RESUMO 
Considerando os Estados e outras entidades políticas como produtores e os impostos como 
um preço, este estudo faz a ligação entre os efeitos, sobejamente estudados na 
Microeconomia, das estruturas de mercado e a controversa Curva de Laffer, sugerindo que o 
resultado do “mercado de impostos” depende também da competição. Estudando os 
determinantes da receita do Imposto Municipal sobre Imóveis (IMI) para os 308 municípios 
Portugueses, é desenvolvido um modelo geral que explica com sucesso a receita fiscal. É 
encontrada alguma evidência estatística para a existência, na amostra, de uma Curva de Laffer 
com múltiplos máximos, e vários testes indicam que a competição influencia – deslocando 
mas também alterando – a Curva de Laffer, fazendo com que municípios mais competitivos 
maximizem a sua receita fiscal com taxas de imposto mais reduzidas – i.e. com um preço 
mais reduzido – que aqueles em ambientes mais monopolistas. 
ABSTRACT 
Regarding states and state-like entities as producers and taxation as a price, this study 
connects the thoroughly studied impacts of the market structures in microeconomics to the 
controversial Laffer curve, suggesting that the outcome of the “taxation market” depends also 
on competition.  By studying the determinants for Property Tax revenue for the 308 
Portuguese municipalities, a general model that successfully explains tax revenue is 
developed. Some evidence is found for the existence of a multiple-peaked Laffer curve in the 
sample, and various tests indicate that competition impacts – shifting but also changing – the 
Laffer curve, causing more competitive municipalities to maximize revenue at lower tax rates 
– i.e. lower prices –  than those in a more monopolistic setting. 
KEYWORDS 
Laffer curve, Taxation, Market Structure, Competition, Municipalities, Portugal 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Why did Arthur Laffer’s schematic drawing of a curve – a mountain-resembling curve that 
would forever bear his name - on a napkin of a New York’s restaurant in 1974, have such an 
impact as to influence notable political platforms and economic teaching alike, becoming a 
benchmark of supply-side economics? This question deserves careful analysis, especially if 
we consider that the essence of the Laffer effect, i.e. that beyond a certain point, an increase in 
the tax rate may cause a fall of tax revenue, had been known for centuries, a notable example 
being the Confederate “tariff clause”1. The reason may be that, in its pragmatic simplicity, the 
Laffer curve contains a powerful lesson, which although it might not always apply in each 
objective situation, nevertheless gives us notable insights about human behavior and its 
response to taxation.  
Much research has been done in order to gain a better understanding of the Laffer curve and, 
among many “minor” explanations, two major effects are pointed, namely: the elasticity of 
the supply of labor and capital, i.e., as taxes rise, there may be less incentives to work or 
invest; tax evasion, as higher taxes provide incentives for economic agents to move to the 
informal economy, and, if they reach a certain level, the fairness of the tax, and thus the ethic 
duty to pay it, may come into question, to a point where tax evasion may be socially accepted 
and even applauded
2
. However, most analyses on the Laffer curve tend to focus on how the 
Laffer curve comes into being, and not on what the Laffer curve is, and, perhaps due to this, 
have forgotten, or at least insufficiently explored, what may prove to be a major explanation 
for the Laffer curve, which is the market structure of taxation, or, as we will call it, the 
“competition effect”.  
The main goal of this study is precisely to gain insights about whether and how the market 
structure of the taxation market impacts the outcome of taxation in general and the Laffer 
curve, which is a specific representation of taxation outcomes – in particular. Does greater 
(lesser) competition lead to lower (higher) prices? Can the Laffer curve represent the 
outcomes of the taxation market? If it can, what shape does that Laffer curve have – classical, 
                                                          
1
 This “tariff clause” (Article I, Section 8, Clause 1 of the Constitution of the Confederate States of America, 
adopted on March 11, 1861) is analyzed by McGuire and Cott (2002), who show its significance as a 
predecessor to Laffer’s insight, especially in contrast with the analogous clause of the United States Constitution. 
2
 These two effects are remarkably well explained by Feige and McGee (1983). 
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asymmetrically one-peaked, two-peaked, multiple-peaked? –, and how does competition 
affect its shape? 
Indeed, taxation can be seen as one – usually, the major – price for the existence and the 
maintenance of a state or of a state-like entity, and for the services it provides to its citizens, 
which may be more or less extensive.  Thus, to a certain extent – and to a certain extent only – 
taxation can be analyzed as a market where consumers, i.e. taxpayers, demand certain goods 
(e.g. safety, rule of law), from certain producers, i.e. state or state-like entities
3
. The Laffer 
curve is simply the representation, from the producer’s perspective, of the possible outcomes 
(i.e. levels of revenue), according to different prices (i.e. tax levels) that result from the 
aforementioned market-like interaction. 
The competitive structure of a market will influence its possible outcomes, i.e. price, quantity, 
consumer and supplier surpluses. This market-like interaction between state and taxpayers 
should be no exception. However, does it make sense to talk about competition in this sense, 
especially when considering states? The answer is an emphatic yes, and some examples 
should suffice to demonstrate it. 
Competition between states in the field of taxes can seem more intuitive in a corporate tax 
perspective, due to the high mobility of capital (especially in comparison with labor), where 
tax havens (i.e. jurisdictions with relatively low taxes, or even without certain taxes) are a 
well-known phenomena; or in the case of countries for which competitive taxation is seen as a 
synonym for economic development (e.g. Ireland). However, this competition can arise in 
other taxes, for example, in the personal income tax, its impact depending on the type of 
income and on the mobility of the labor factor.  
Overall, however, it seems safe to assume that the competitive environment subjacent to the 
global (i.e. considering all taxes) Laffer curve for most states is one close to a monopoly: one 
cannot easily change its country of residence, and for many, due to countless reasons (e.g. 
strong family, cultural or national ties), such a change is at least highly undesirable and to be 
considered only in extreme circumstances. 
                                                          
3
 Bell and Kirschner (2009) made a very similar reasoning when discussing the meaning of effective property tax 
rates: “to the extent the property tax serves as a benefits tax, the effective property tax rate reflects the 'price' of 
locally provided goods and services to property owners”.  
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Thus, we arrive at a better understanding of what the Laffer curve is, building up on what we 
have previously said: it is a representation of the state’s (or state-like entities’) fiscal 
revenues, based on a market-like interaction where the state acts as a producer, a market 
which is never one of perfect competition, and may even, depending on the tax, closely 
resemble monopoly conditions. This is the reason why the maximum point of the Laffer curve 
represents the maximum revenue for the state but isn’t necessarily the social optimum, it does 
not necessarily optimize overall welfare. 
Hence, after having a new vision about what the Laffer curve is, we can proceed to the 
question: how does competition – what we called the competition effect – affect the Laffer 
curve and its analysis? What should characterize the Laffer curve of a state involved in a more 
competitive environment (e.g. because that state is part of a federation) vis-à-vis a state in 
(quasi-)monopolistic condition (e.g. an isolated state with strong anti-emigration policy)?  
This competition effect should cause more competitive states or state-like entities to, caeteris 
paribus, have a Laffer curve which is shifted left and upwards, with its maximum point 
corresponding thus to a lower fiscal level (i.e. price) than states with more monopolistic 
conditions. The reasoning is simple: when a given market is competitive, the producer 
maximizes its revenue with a lower price than when a market is less competitive, as 
competition forces the producer to either lower prices or to be, at least partially, driven out of 
the market (e.g. losing market share)
4
.  
However, and these could be the reasons why this effect has remain unexplored, there are at 
least two major obstacles that require resolution – two mountains that we must cross – in 
order to correctly assess the impact of competition on the Laffer curve. We will thus explain 
each obstacle and provide our first insights on how to overcome them in our investigation. 
The first obstacle concerns the existence of anything that could resemble a perfect 
competition market if we consider the aforementioned concept of taxation as one of the prices 
for the existence of a state and of the services it provides (which may vary in a wide range 
from state to state). If, in this context, we could easily imagine a monopoly
5
, and even more 
                                                          
4
 As basic microeconomics show, in a perfect competition market the price is set when demand equals marginal 
cost, thus leading to zero profit. This is, for the producer, truly profit maximization, albeit somewhat inexplicit, 
as any other option (i.e. setting the price higher or lower) would drive it out of the market. On the other hand, the 
price formation of a monopolist is explicitly called profit maximization, as the monopolist produces up to the 
point where its marginal revenue is equal to its marginal cost. 
5 
For example: an isolated, totalitarian state, with strong anti-emigration policies. 
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easily identify quasi-monopolistic scenarios – to that purpose it suffices to keep in mind the 
that one cannot easily change its country of residence –, the examples diminish as we seek 
states that could represent more integrated markets, a confederation or a federation of states 
being the utmost examples that could be provided within this scope. 
By analyzing municipalities, which may be, in some senses, state-like entities, it is possible to 
find a degree of competition unmatched by states. However, not every municipality in every 
state would be eligible for this analysis. It is essential, in order to discern the competition 
effect, that the market interactions proper to competition be present. In this case, this means 
that in order to be eligible for this purpose, a municipality must have the autonomy to set (and 
to change), at least within a certain range, at least one tax rate
6
. Municipalities present 
numerous other advantages to this type of study, the most obvious being its large number, 
which allows for very large potential samples. But the existence of an immense number of 
municipalities is not, in this case, purely a statistical or methodological advantage, as with 
increasing numbers we obtain also increasing diversity, namely diversity of competitive 
environment. The homogeneity of taxes within a state allows for a more accurate comparison 
between municipalities of that state – and thus for a more accurate analysis – than any 
comparison that could be made between states, which more often than not have different 
taxes, and, even when they are conceptually the same, other conditions contained in their 
respective tax codes (e.g. exemptions) may cause the application of these taxes to differ 
widely. A comparison between municipalities has the further advantage relative to a 
comparison between countries of greatly diminishing the impact of other variables that could 
affect tax revenue but which are not easily observable or quantifiable (e.g. cultural, 
sociological, and even, in some cases, religious factors). 
Having brought municipalities into our discussion, it is important to mention that competition 
among municipalities, which can be translated into concepts like strategic interactions, tax 
mimicking and yardstick competition, has been recognized and studied, but never connected 
to the Laffer phenomena. We regard the study of competitive interactions between local 
governments not so much as alternative explanations to Laffer hypothesis, but rather as 
complementary, in the sense that these studies provided insights into the mechanisms that 
drive competition, which we suggest to be itself one of the major effects that contribute to the 
                                                          
6
 Obviously, a municipality would only be eligible to an analysis of the competition effect in the Laffer curve if 
there be an identity between the taxes included in the Laffer curve and the taxes in which municipalities have the 
aforementioned autonomy, e.g. if in a given country municipalities only have autonomy to set a vehicle tax, then 
municipalities are only suitable as a basis for a study of the competition effect on a Laffer for the vehicle tax. 
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Laffer phenomena. By establishing this “missing link” that connects more clearly competition 
to the Laffer curve, we hope to help avoiding a false dichotomy or antagonism between those 
two paths of research that have been unconnected, but that may, even with necessarily 
different methodologies and perspectives, prove to be as we deem them: complementary. 
The second obstacle is due to the difficulty of distinguishing between the effect caused by 
market structures – what we call the competition effect – from the effect of greater or smaller 
labor and capital supply elasticity which we saw, is the one of the two major known effects 
behind the Laffer curve. An example will hopefully make this difficulty clear: if, due to a tax 
hike on country A, a company decides to cut its investments on country A and increase 
instead its investments on country B, is this to be assigned to the competition effect or to the 
elasticity effect? The answer would probably be: to both. It can be thus difficult, in some 
cases, to make a clear-cut distinction, and this difficulty could hurt our endeavor, which 
basically consists in highlighting the specificity and the identity of the competition effect. 
Bearing in mind the goals of this investigation, this obstacle can be overcome by focusing on 
a type of tax where the two major effects already identified by the literature (labor and capital 
supply elasticity and tax evasion) are absent or almost absent, in order to determine if there is 
such a thing as a competition effect. We have chosen to use the Property Tax, especially the 
Property Tax on real estate, in order to conduct the investigation. The reasons are simple: here 
considerations on capital or labor supply elasticity are relatively absent, and tax evasion, due 
to the object of the tax itself – property, especially real estate – is relatively difficult to 
achieve and may thus be considered insignificant. Kim, et al. (2009) provide a good summary 
of the characteristics of the Property Tax: in comparison with other taxes
7
, it is a relatively 
progressive tax, with low tax base mobility, where the links between tax burden and benefits 
are easy to perceive, and so is the tax base. 
We also chose this tax because in many countries this tax is closely associated with its 
municipalities, the tax rates often being set (at least within a certain range) at the municipal 
level, and its revenues appertaining to the municipalities. Our path will be, thus, to analyze 
the relation between Property Tax levels and Property Tax revenues of municipalities which 
have the autonomy to set (even if within certain limits) the Property Tax rates and to collect 
                                                          
7
 In Kim, et al. (2009) the comparison was drawn between the Property Tax and the sales tax, in the context of 
the State of Georgia, United States of America (USA). 
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their revenue. This is the case of Portugal, where municipalities are able to set the tax rates
8
 
(within certain limits set at the national level) and collect its revenue. This and further reasons 
detailed on Section 3 make the Portuguese municipalities a fertile ground for developing our 
analysis. 
Having addressed the difficulties that our endeavor could face, we can now further detail the 
contribute that our work aims to bring to the Laffer curve literature, which is twofold. First, to 
analyze whether the Laffer effect can explain the relation between tax rate and revenue for the 
Property Tax for the municipalities in our sample, and whether that relationship can be 
expressed by a Laffer curve, which is something that, to our knowledge, has never been object 
of study.  Previous literature has dealt essentially with overall taxation, focusing especially on 
income taxation, and usually attempting to draw national Laffer curves and presenting 
national comparisons. Second, to provide a new, unprecedented explanation for the Laffer 
curve phenomenon: adding to the two major effects already proposed by the literature, i.e. 
labor and capital supply elasticity and tax evasion, we suggest that taxation can be regarded to 
a certain extent as a “market”, and that the structure of this market (i.e. more competitive or 
more monopolistic) influences the position and the design of the Laffer curve – to this we call 
the competition effect. 
Each of these contributes is important. The growing demands for greater fiscal autonomy for 
local authorities, as well as the role of Property Tax as a significant revenue generator, which 
are explained by McCluskey and Plimmer (2011), highlight the importance of exploring in 
greater detail the behavior of Property Tax receipts, especially in relation to tax levels – a 
relation which the Laffer curve aims to adress – and in the framework of local taxation. On 
the other hand, the study of the impact of competition on municipal taxes and revenue can 
bring new insights on the essence of the Laffer curve that may apply to other types of taxes 
and to other administrative units. 
  
                                                          
8
 The exception being rural property, for which the applicable tax rate is defined at the national level. 
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2. RELATED LITERATURE 
The literature on the Laffer curve is large, varied and multidisciplinary. Laffer (1981) explains 
some major causal effects of the curve bearing his name, namely the impact that variations on 
taxation can have on the supply of labor and the supply of capital, and also how tax evasion – 
as well as tax avoidance – becomes more attractive when taxes are higher. Lévy-Garboua, et 
al. (2009) focus on behavorial aspects on the reaction to tax increases, and highlight the 
importance of social norms and the perception of fairness or unfairness of a given tax increase 
as decisive to the reaction of taxpayers, and suggest that a social norm of fair taxation may set 
50% as the limit, with the result that a tax increase that places taxation beyond the level 
accepted as fair will cause a strong emotional rejection on the part of taxpayers.  
A major insight pointing to the importance of competition comes from Ihori and Yang (2012), 
who point that the self-interest of rent-seeking politicians may be one motivation for setting 
the tax rate in the prohibitive area of the Laffer curve, and suggest that competition between 
governments may be more effective in avoiding overtaxation than political protests. A 
paradox in the findings of Hammar, et al. (2009) also points to the importance of competition: 
although a pure economical perspective of tax optimization would suggest that taxes with 
inelastic bases provide the best ground for tax increases, the study has shown that the most 
unpopular tax in Sweden is precisely the ne plus ultra of inelastic tax bases: the real estate 
tax, the very object of our present study through its Portuguese counterpart. Indeed, the 
competition effect becomes manifest in the gap between the predictions of arithmetical tax 
optimization and the reality of human response to taxation.  
Porca, et al. (2012) in their USA-based study find that competiton between neighbouring 
states is a relevant determinant in the choice of tax instruments, and, consequently, in the tax 
structures of different states. Although holding a thoroughly analsys of tax bases and the tax 
mechanisms used to cope with inter-state competition, no assement is made of the impact of 
competition on the behavior of tax revenue. In a similar fashion, the recent study of Costa and 
Carvalho (2013) identifies strategic interactions between Portuguese municipalities, based 
precisely on the Property Tax. Both these studies focus on the mechanisms that may work 
behind the competition effect and not on the effect itself in what regards its impact on the 
outcome of taxation. Our attempt envisages precisely to assess this later impact.  
8 
 
Among the most common endeavors of the Laffer curve literature were the determination of 
the maximum point of different national Laffer curves, a good example being the work of 
Heijman and van Ophem (2005), which estimates the revenue maximizing taxation rates for 
12 OECD countries. The benchmark of this type of work is, for us, set by Trabandt and Uhlig 
(2011), where Laffer curves for the United States, the European Union
9
 and individual 
European countries are drawn and compared using a neoclassical growth model, segregating 
the distinct Laffer curves for labor tax and capital tax; and the subsequent Trabandt and Uhlig 
(2012), which, building up on the former work, expands and corrects some aspects of the 
analysis, namely adressing the overstatement of the labor revenue to GDP figures, through the 
introduction of  monopolistic competition in capital income, and considering the scenario that 
recent fiscal changes, which were noted in Trabandt and Uhlig (2011), although intended to 
be temporary, assume a permanent nature. The goal of our paper could be seen as to 
complement these two works, exploring more explicitly the effect of the tax market structure 
on tax revenues and also by covering the Property Tax, hiertho unexplored. 
A much disputed issue on the Laffer curve literature has been the shape of the curve itself, an 
issue which we cannot evade in our study. The most daring challenge to the classical, 
parabolic shape with one peak proposed by Laffer, comes from Spiegel and Templeman 
(2004), who claim to “debunk” the traditional Laffer curve, asserting it to be “very likely” 
that a macro Laffer curve has multiple – at least two – peaks, due to the prevalence of high 
degrees of inequality in wage distribution in many western countries. The possibility of 
multiple peakes will be taken into account in our study. 
  
                                                          
9
 The European Union here is considered at its 15-countries stage, as before the 2004 enlargement, with the 
exception of Luxembourg. 
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3. PROPERTY TAX AND PORTUGUESE MUNICIPALITIES 
The existing Property Tax in Portugal, the Imposto Municipal sobre Imóveis
10
, entered into 
force in 2003. The preface to the Property Tax Code clearly explains the motives behind its 
implementation, namely the aim to modernize a type of tax that was, in the past, conceived 
and directed basically to rural property, updating it – especially its system of property valuing 
– so as to provide a more balanced and fair valuing of urban property. 
Municipalities can set rates within a range defined by at the national level, the ranges being 
contained in the Property Tax Code
11
. The exception to this local autonomy concerns rural 
property, for which a nation-wide 0.8% tax rate applies, being set in the Property Tax Code 
instead of a tax range. 
For urban property, two distinct ranges existed until 2012: for property which had already 
been valued according to rules of the new Property Tax Code, the rate could range from 0.2% 
to 0.4% (0.3% to 0.5% from 2012 onwards) of the property’s tax registered value12 and from 
0.4% to 0.7% (0.5% to 0.8% for year 2012) for the urban property that had not yet been valed 
according to the new Property Tax Code. The later rate has since ceased to apply, due to the 
general revaluation of real property ordered by the Law no. 60-A/2011, and thus a unified tax 
for urban property exists since 2013. 
In order to facilitate the understanding of these changes in the legislation and in the Property 
Tax rates, we provide a timeline – Timeline 1 – below. 
The revenue of the Property Tax in each municipality is a revenue of the municipality, with 
an exception: 50% of the revenue of Property Tax on rural property goes to the freguesias, 
which are the lowest political-administrative unit in the Portuguese Republic. 
 
  
                                                          
10
 The literal translation is «Municipal Real Estate Tax», but we will stick to the more free translation «Property 
Tax». 
11
 More specifically on its article 112.  
12
 Valor Patrimonial Tributário, literally “taxable patrimonial value”. We prefer the translation “tax registered 
value”, as it conveys more clearly the notion that this value is dependent of criteria that are defined by the 
legislator and employed by the tax authorities, i.e. this value does not depend directly, for example, of the 
transaction value, and is often employed precisely to avoid tax evasion based on distorted transaction values. 
10 
 
 
Timeline 1: Property Tax 2008-2014 
  Sample Period     
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
           
          Single Urban Tax Rate Range 
           0.3% to 0.5% 
 all urban property is valued according to 
the 2003 Tax Code 
 rural property rate unaltered 
              
              
        New Ranges     
         0.3% to 0.5% (urban property, 2003 Tax Code rules) 
 0.5% to 0.8% (urban property, pre-2003 Tax Code rules) 
 rural property rate unaltered 
         
         
Property Tax Rates          
 0.2% to 0.4% (urban property, 2003 Tax Code rules) 
 0.4% to 0.7% (urban property, pre-2003 Tax Code rules) 
 0.8% (rural property) 
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4. DATA AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
4.1 Data 
The construction of our model starts, as one would expect from a study which aims to study 
the Laffer curve, by obtaining the Property Tax rates and the Property Tax revenues for the 
308 Portuguese municipalities.   
The Property Tax rates are obtained from the public area of the Portuguese Tax 
Administration, while the values of tax revenue for years 2009, 2010, 2011 and 2012 are 
obtained from the PORDATA database (Fundação Francisco Manuel dos Santos, 2014). The 
revenue is expressed per capita, which is the adequate metric for such an analysis.   
Winsorization at the 1
st
 and 99
th
 percentiles is applied in order to reduce the effect of outliers. 
4.2 Control Variables 
In order to test the Laffer hypothesis – which implies to study how tax rates impact tax 
revenue – one must control for a series of other potential determinants of tax revenue. We 
propose a twofold division for these variables: general determinants and specific 
determinants. General determinants are those variables that are recognized in the literature as 
affecting all types of tax. By specific determinants we mean variables that should be 
particularly relevant when studying the impacts on Property Tax, but which would be less 
important or outright irrelevant when discussing general tax impacts. 
As to general determinants, the first variable that comes to mind is the Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP) per capita as a measure for economic power, the rationale being simple: 
caeteris paribus, richer municipalities should have higher tax revenue. However, here a 
limitation – which will be ever present – appears: the data must be available at the municipal 
level, which is not the case for GDP per capita
13
. A good substitute for this measure is the 
Purchasing Power per capita, which is obtained at PORDATA at the municipal level for year 
2009 and 2011 (information for years 2010 and 2012 is not available), and serves our purpose 
of portraying the economic power asymmetries within Portugal. We will also take into 
account the unemployment rate, a variable used by Kim, et al. (2009), expecting it to have a 
                                                          
13
 Albeit on a slightly different model, Calabrese and Carroll (2012) use per capita personal income for this 
purpose, but neither is this variable available for us at the municipal level.   
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negative impact on tax revenue. We obtain unemployment rates according to the 2011 
Population Census by municipality at the PORDATA database.  
In what concerns specific factors that may impact in a particular fashion on Property Tax, we 
introduce two variables related to real estate. The first is the average valuing of real estate 
performed by banks in each municipality (measured in euro per square meter), a variable 
which we obtain at PORDATA database for years 2009, 2010 and 2011 and that we predict to 
be positively correlated with tax revenue. One should note that the tax valuing of a property, 
which serves as base to the Property Tax is different from the valuing perfomed by the banks, 
the later being much more market-driven than the former. 
A second variable that we add to our analysis is the ammount of granted mortgage housing 
loans by municipality, this data being available for all the years of our sample, once again at 
the PORDATA database, from where we obtain also the population figures for each of these 
years for every municipality, in order to place the housing loans variable in a per capita basis. 
Table 1: Variable Definitions 
Variable Description Prediction 
PTREVpc Property Tax Revenue per capita N.A. 
PTRATE 
Property Tax Rate for urban property valued in accordance with 
the 2003 Property Tax Code 
Complex 
PP 
Relative Purchasing Power for each Portuguese Municipality 
based on years 2009 and 2011. National Average = 100 
(+) 
UNEMP 
Unemployment Rate in each Municipality, measured by the  
2011 population census 
(-) 
RELpc 
Per capita Amount of Real Estate Loans granted by resident 
financial entities in Portugal 
(+) 
AREV 
Average Real Estate Value, a market-based valuing performed 
by Portuguese financial entities of the real estate in each 
municipality (€ / m2), available only for years 2009, 2010 and 
2011 
(+) 
COMPLVL 
Competition Level: Municipalities are assigned to one of three 
levels: High Competition (HC), Average Competition (AC) or 
Low Competition (LC) 
N.A. 
CDUMMY_I Dummy Variable: 0 if COMPLVL = “LC”, 1 if otherwise (+) 
CDUMMY_II Dummy Variable: 1 if COMPLVL = “HC”, 0 if otherwise (+) 
YEAR 2009, 2010, 2011 or 2012 (+) 
Whenever data is unavailable as a whole for a certain year for the control variables, we 
assume that the values in that year equal those of the previous year. Thus, we use the 
purchasing power values of 2009 and 2011 also for 2010 and 2012, respectively. Likewise, 
we use the average real estate values of 2011 for year 2012. For the unemployment figures, 
we rely always on the values of the 2011 census, as its figures are much more reliable and 
realistic than the unemployment estimates provided yearly. 
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Some sporadic cases of missing data will place some minor restrictions on our sample. On 
Table 2 we present the restrictions that lead to the ultimate sample composition. 
Table 2: Sample Formation 
 Description 
Remaining 
Observations 
Portuguese Municipalities 308 × 4 years 1,232 
PTREVpc No missing obs. 1,232 
 PP No missing obs. 1,232 
UNEMP No missing obs. 1,232 
RELpc Missing 54 obs. 1,178 
AREV Missing 120 obs. 1,079 
Observations on Final Sample 1,079 
The missing data for real estate valuing (AREV) and for the value of real estate loans per 
capita (RELpc) is not neglegible in number, but its impact is geographically restricted, as it is  
essentially due to missing data municipalities in the Autonomous Regions of Azores and 
Madeira. The restrictions due to missing RELpc and AREV data will not impact the models 
that will solely use tax rates to explain tax revenue. No instance of sporadic missing data 
exists for the tax revenue, purchasing power and unemployment figures. 
4.3 Tax Rates 
As mentioned on section 3, during the period of our sample two different tax rates could 
apply to real estate, depending on whether the property had been valued according to the rules 
of the 2003 Property Tax Code or not. This raises the question of which tax rate should be 
incorporated in our models, or whether both should be included, either through a kind of 
weighted variable taking into account both rates, or through the separte inclusion of the two 
Property Tax rates. 
We believe there are strong reasons for taking into account only the tax rate for real estate 
valued under the 2003 rules. Indeed, as time went on, the rate for non-valued became 
progressively less relevant. This is even truer when discussing competition and competitive 
dynamics, as these are strictly related with new or transactioned properties, all of these having 
been valued according to the 2003 Property Tax Code. 
This problem could potentially be solved by creating a true weighted tax rate, one that would 
weight both tax rates according to the proportion of property they apply to, idealistically at a 
municipal level. Since such information is not available, introducing a second, hardly relevant 
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rate – which became altogether irrelevant in 2013 – would risk introducing unnecessary 
distortion without any tangible benefit. 
4.4  Competition Levels 
Given that we wish to study the impact of competition of the Property Tax revenue, our 
analysis will be richer if we work with a heterogeneous sample, i.e. a sample that includes 
both municipalities in very competitive settings, either because they make part of a metropolis 
or because they compete in the international vacation home market; and municipalities where 
little to no competition exists, for example in poorer regions with high unemployment rates. 
Portugal, despite having a land area of only 35,603 square miles and a population of only 
approximately 10,5 million, is a country of deep economical and geographical contrasts, and 
is thus a prime sample for our purpose. Indeed, very strong asymmetries exist between the 
more economically developed Portuguese Atlantic coastline and the interior (Silva and 
Ribeiro, 2012; Morais and Fernandes, 2011). 
In order to serve as a base for our tests on the impact of competition, we will divide our 
sample according to three competition levels: High Competition (HC), Average Competition 
(AC) and Low Competition (LC). We will assign municipalities en bloc according to the 
assignment given to their region, and we will draw on the statistical NUTS III administrative 
divisions for that purpose, with an exception for the Autonomous Regions of Azores and 
Madeira.   
The municipalities of Grande Lisboa and Península de Setúbal, which form the Lisbon 
Metropolitan Area; of Grande Porto and Entre Douro e Vouga, which form the Greater 
Metropolitan Area of Porto; as well as of Algarve are classified as High Competition, a total 
of 48 municipalities. Lisbon and Porto are the two only Portuguese metropolises, and have 
experienced significant migratory fluxes between the municipalities of each metropolis, being 
a potential fertile ground for tax competition.  The Algarve region is the most famous 
Portuguese touristic destination and one of the most important European touristic destinations, 
also being famous for being an attractive vacation home market and having a growing influx 
of foreign residents. 
The remaining municipalities of the Portuguese Atlantic coastline – namely those of the 
Minho-Lima, Cávado, Ave, Tâmega, Baixo Vouga, Baixo Mondego, Pinhal Litoral, Oeste, 
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Médio Tejo, Alentejo Litoral and Lezíria do Tejo regions – are classified in the category 
Average Competition, as well as  the municipalities of the archipelago of Madeira. While the 
classification of the former is intuitive, as the coastline municipalities are generally 
economically developed, have access to excellent infrastructures – including highways, 
railways and seaports – but remain clearly a level behind the Metropolitan Areas of Lisbon 
and Porto, the classification of Madeira in this category is a compromise between its 
unfavorable geographical position and its high degree of economic development, especially in 
what pertains to real estate
14
.  The Average Competition group has thus a total of 113 
municipalities. 
 The municipalities of interior Portugal, economically less developed, with persistent 
unemployment, with significant outgoing migration and with a less favorable geographical 
position, are classified with the label Low Competition. These are the municipalities in the 
NUTS III regions of Douro, Alto Trás-os-Montes, Pinhal Interior Norte, Dão-Lafões, Pinhal 
Interior Sul, Serra da Estrela, Beira Interior Norte, Beira Interior Sul, Cova da Beira, Alto 
Alentejo, Alentejo Central and Baixo Alentejo. We also include the Archipelago of Azores. A 
total of 147 municipalities are classified as Low Competition.  
Table 3: Regions and Municipalities according to Competition Level 
 
                                                          
14
 The categorization of Madeira can obviously change, and in order to correctly categorize this archipelago one 
has to monitor the future evolution as the two main drivers (geographic conditionalisms and economic 
development). It should be particularly interesting to follow the economic impacts of the 2011 bail-out to the 
Madeira Regional Government.  
Competition Level 
(COMPLVL) 
NUTS III / Autonomous Regions 
Number of 
Municipalities 
High (HC) 
Grande Lisboa, Península de Setúbal, Grande Porto, 
Entre Douro e Vouga 
48 
Average (AC) 
Minho-Lima, Cávado, Ave, Tâmega, Baixo Vouga, 
Baixo Mondego, Pinhal Litoral, Oeste, Médio Tejo, 
Alentejo Litoral, Lezíria do Tejo, R.A. Madeira 
113 
Low (LC) 
Douro, Alto Trás-os-Montes, Pinhal Interior Norte, 
Dão-Lafões, Pinhal Interior Sul, Serra da Estrela, 
Beira Interior Norte, Beira Interior Sul, Cova da Beira, 
Alto Alentejo, Alentejo Central, Baixo Alentejo, R.A. 
Açores 
147 
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4.5 Summary Statistics 
We present summary statistics (number of observations, mean, median, standard deviation, 
maximum and minimum) for our main variables, which are displayed on Table 8 (Appendix 
A). These descriptive statistics show some consistent trends which are in accordance with the 
rationale that lead to the segmentation of regions (and their municipalities) according to 
distinct competitive levels. 
Indeed, there is a consistent trend for more (less) competitive municipalities having higher 
(lower) averages for tax revenue, tax rates, purchasing power, unemployment, real estate 
loans per capita and average real estate value, i.e. for all variables. One can, however, 
envisage a surprise in relation to one of our predictions: unemployment is higher on average 
on more competitive municipalities, which also seem to have higher tax revenue on average. 
We will thus keep this variable under a special focus during our analysis.  
We compute the correlation coefficients between the tax revenue and the explanatory 
variables, the results being displayed on Table 4
15
, and we find significant positive correlation 
with all the explanatory variables, including unemployment, which goes against our 
prediction, as we had predicted a negative correlation. 
The possibility of a positive correlation between unemployment and Property Tax revenue, 
despite not being the focus of our work, deserves at least a tentative explanation. 
Unemployment tends to be larger in urban centers, as in rural areas other options are 
available, like subsistence farming, and stronger informal social protection networks exist 
(e.g. family, vicinity ties). Also, since real estate is usually a long-term asset, it should not be 
influenced by short-term or recent unemployment, and a more structured analysis of 
unemployment would be necessary, one that would, for example, analyze historical 
unemployment rates and the timings of real estate investment decisions.  
  
                                                          
15
 In all our tables, *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. All our 
statistical tests are bilateral. 
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Table 4: Correlation Statistics 
 
  
PTREVpc 
 Total LC AC HC 
PTRATE 
0.41 
*** 
0.55 
*** 
0.44 
*** 
0.10 
n.s. 
PP 
0.56 
*** 
0.56 
*** 
0.70 
*** 
0.09 
n.s. 
UNEMP 
0.18 
*** 
0.03 
*** 
-0.18 
*** 
0.29 
*** 
RELpc 
0.46 
*** 
0.39 
*** 
0.38 
*** 
0.22 
*** 
AREV 
0.71 
*** 
0.12 
*** 
0.47 
*** 
0.69 
*** 
YEAR 
0.10 
*** 
0.20 
*** 
0.14 
** 
0.12 
n.s. 
18 
 
5. THE LAFFER CURVE AND THE DETERMINANTS OF PROPERTY TAX REVENUE 
5.1 Testing the Laffer Hypothesis 
Our first goal is to test whether the Laffer hypothesis holds for Property Tax in our sample. 
However, in order to do so, we will begin by testing the following model type which does not 
recognize the Laffer hypothesis: 
                                                                    
             
 (5.1) 
Here, like in all the following models, “i” corresponds to each of the Portuguese 
municipalities and “t” corresponds to years 2009, 2010, 2011 or 2012.  
The structure of this type of model does not take into account the Laffer effect, as it has a 
single and linear coefficient (β1) that relates tax rates (PTRATE) to per capita tax revenue 
(PTREVpc), that is, it assumes that increasing tax rates are correlated with increasing –
because one predicts the coefficient to be  positive – tax revenue.  
Before advancing further, a brief discussion on heteroskedasticy must be made. A simple 
graphical and statistical analysis of the distribution of the per capita tax revenue according to 
the different tax rates clearly shows the presence of heteroskedasticity in the sample, the 
variance being much higher on the extreme rates, i.e. around the minimum and maximum 
legal rates. We run the White’s Test for testing the presence of heteroskedastacity, which 
confirms the rejection of the null hypothesis, i.e. we reject the hypothesis of 
homoskedasticity. 
We will thus use the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimation, applying the White’s 
Correction in order to address the presence of heteroskedasticity. In order to strengthen our 
results, we will make a second estimation using Weighted Least Squares (WLS), where we 
will use a weight based on the real estate value (AREV), namely its inverse variance. We will, 
for each regression aimed at explaining tax revenue, use this second estimation method in 
order to improve the robustness of our results, unless stated otherwise. 
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As we have mentioned, the regressions based on Equation 5.1 do not take into account – 
indeed its formal expression contradicts or at least ignores – the Laffer effect, whereby from a 
certain point an increase of the tax rate may lead to lower tax revenue. The classical 
representation of the Laffer curve is a concave (on the most schematic representation, a 
parabolic) curve, which may be represented by a second order equation. Consequently, we 
adapt our model in order to take into account the Laffer effect. 
                                       
                        
                                  
(5.2) 
In order to form a classical Laffer peak, the coefficient β1a should be positive and the 
coefficient β1b should be negative. The introduction of the new variable is to be tested by 
comparing the restrained model (expressed in Equation 5.1) to the unrestrained model 
(expressed in Equation 5.2), applying the redundant variables test as to discern whether the 
introduction of new variables produces a statistically significant improvement. Such test 
evaluates whether incorporating a mechanism that allows for Laffer effect expressed on its 
classical form improves the model or not. This procedure and its rationale will be repeated in 
the following section. 
5.2 The Laffer Curve Shape Controversies 
The controversies around the possible shapes of the Laffer curve are old and play a 
preeminent role in Laffer literature. A hypothesis suggested by Spiegel and Templeman 
(2004) is particularly relevant to our present study: in a very strong-worded article, they claim 
to “debunk” the traditional concave curve with one peak which represents the traditional form 
of the Laffer curve, and suggest a curve with at least two peakes. 
We will take into consideration this possibility, by running regressions with the structure of 
the equation below. Indeed, a fourth-order equation where the coefficients for the second and 
forth order variables are negative and the first and third variable coefficients are positive may 
form a two-peaked curve, thus reflecting the theory advanced by Spiegel and Templeman 
(2004). 
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(5.3) 
As in the previous models, we will run this equation using both OLS with the White’s 
Correction for heteroskedascity and WLS; and test whether any improvement was made by 
the introductions of the second, third and fourth-degree terms. 
5.3 The Laffer Curve through Rate-Revenue Models  
A possible objection to the models that we have been presenting is that the Laffer effect must 
be analyzed by studying the direct relationship between tax rate and tax revenue, with no 
additional variables: after all, the Laffer curve is a graphical expression of that relation, and 
nothing more. Therefore, is it correct to mix the sole and only (direct) explanatory variable of 
the Laffer curve with other variables which are foreign to the model?  
Yes and no. We do not intend to introduce new explanatory variables on the Laffer curve, but 
rather to actually perform a “reality check” to the Laffer effect. We do recognize that part of 
the Laffer effect may – and indeed should – be contained in other variables that indirectly 
affect the Laffer curve and that have here been placed side by side with the direct Laffer 
curve’s sole explanatory variable – i.e. tax rate. However, that is necessary in order to discern 
the effect that tax rates exercise per se. 
However, it does make sense to express our findings in a Laffer-like setting, i.e. using tax 
rates as the only explanatory variables, not only due to the conceptual objection we have just 
discussed, but such a step seems necessary also in order to gain further insights about the 
shape of the Laffer curve, and even useful to assess its existence.   
For that purpose, we will present, for each regression, a reduced version of the model 
containing only tax rates as explanatory variables, to which we call “rate-revenue”. We will 
often refer to the effects of competition on the rate-revenue model, as it is a broader concept 
than the Laffer curve, the later being a subset of the former, having also the advantage of 
raising no a priori biases, being an expression void of political and ideological connotations.  
The equations for the rate-revenue models are as follows: 
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 (5.4) 
                                       
       
(5.5)  
                                       
              
              
 
      
(5.6) 
5.4 Estimation Results 
The six equations that we have presented thus unfurl at two regressions each, in a total of 
twelve models. Indeed, for each equation we use both the OLS (with the White’s Correction) 
and WLS estimators. Regressions i-iv hold a non-Laffer relationship between tax rate and tax 
revenue; regressions v-viii are designed to allow for a single-peaked curve; regressions ix-xii 
allow for a two-peaked curve. The results are presented on Table 5. 
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Table 5: Results for Models i-xii 
Regression 
No. 
i ii iii iv v vi vii viii ix x xi xii 
Equation 5.1 5.4 5.2 5.5 5.3 5.6 
Type General Rate-Revenue General Rate-Revenue General Rate-Revenue 
Estimator OLS WLS OLS WLS OLS WLS OLS WLS OLS WLS OLS WLS 
Years 2009-2012 
C 
-7,712.79 
* 
-9,221.97 
*** 
-40.81 
*** 
-53.24 
*** 
-7,811.98 
** 
-9,178.00 
*** 
-7.37 
n.s. 
-16.88 
n.s. 
-7,929.67 
n.s. 
-9,605.40 
*** 
2,603.47 
*** 
3,860.49 
*** 
β1 
17,290 
*** 
20,871 
*** 
33,615 
*** 
39,794 
*** 
N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
β1a N/A N/A N/A N/A 
-15.431 
** 
-23,132 
n.s. 
11,672 
n.s. 
16,524 
n.s. 
-605,618 
n.s. 
-799,223 
n.s. 
-3,272,803 
*** 
-4,879,846 
*** 
β1b N/A N/A N/A N/A 
5,038,170 
*** 
6,725,814 
** 
3,412,711 
n.s. 
3,553,986 
n.s. 
2.65E+08 
n.s. 
3.42E+08 
n.s. 
1.49E+09 
*** 
2.23E+09 
*** 
β1c N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
-4.88E+10 
n.s. 
-6.20E+10 
n.s. 
-2.87E+11 
*** 
-4.33E+11 
*** 
β1d N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
3.32E+12 
n.s. 
4.13E+12 
n.s. 
2.02E+13 
*** 
3.06E+13 
*** 
β2 
0.22 
n.s. 
0.07 
n.s. 
N/A N/A 
0.21 
n.s. 
0.05 
n.s. 
N/A N/A 
0.19 
n.s. 
-0.02 
n.s. 
N/A N/A 
β3 
0.46 
*** 
1.02 
*** 
N/A N/A 
0.41 
*** 
0.94 
** 
N/A N/A 
0.42 
*** 
0.97 
** 
N/A N/A 
β4 
0.51 
n.s. 
0.54 
n.s. 
N/A N/A 
0.61 
n.s. 
0.66 
n.s. 
N/A N/A 
0.64 
n.s. 
0.73 
n.s. 
N/A N/A 
β5 
0.14 
*** 
0.15 
*** 
N/A N/A 
0.14 
*** 
0.15 
*** 
N/A N/A 
0.14 
*** 
0.15 
*** 
N/A N/A 
β6 
3.77 
* 
4.50 
*** 
N/A N/A 
3.84 
* 
4.51 
*** 
N/A N/A 
4.14 
n.s. 
5.05 
*** 
N/A N/A 
n 1,079 1,079 1,232 1,112 1,079 1,079 1,232 1,112 1,079 1,079 1,232 1,112 
F-Statistic 
239.40 
*** 
239.72 
*** 
282.33 
*** 
210.32 
*** 
207.16 
*** 
207.89 
*** 
142.22 
*** 
105.76 
*** 
161.30 
*** 
162.31 
*** 
76.33 
*** 
57.97 
*** 
Adj. R
2 0.57 0.57 0.19 0.16 0.57 0.57 0.19 0.16 0.57 0.57 0.20 0.17 
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All control variables have the expected signs, with the exception of unemployment, a surprise 
which had already been foreseen in the correlation analysis, a result for which we had also 
advanced and discussed a possible explanation. 
In what regards the general model, the regressions i and ii show unequivocally that it is 
significant, both converging to a high adjusted-R
2
 value of 0.57. This first result is highly 
important, not only due to the potential practical applications of a model that can explain 
Property Tax revenue with few and easy to obtain inputs, but also because it allows us to 
continue with our research on the impact of competition on tax revenue.  
Before continuing our endeavor, two structural questions must be addressed and settled: First, 
should all the variables remain in the model, i.e. could we improve the model by removing 
statistically insignificant or doubtfully-significant variables? Second, what kind of tax-
revenue/tax-rate relationship should be incorporated into the model? 
Regarding the first question, all control variables seem to be significant, with two exceptions: 
purchasing power and the value of real estate loans per capita. This result is somewhat 
surprising, but may be explained by the fact that the average real estate value variable can 
capture much more efficaciously the income and economic drivers that Purchasing Power 
attempted to address, and the RELpc variable is likely to contribute to the capture of these 
same drivers. However, since the AREV and RELpc variables are arguably less common than 
purchasing power, on Appendix B we will re-estimate the model substituting AREV and 
RELpc for purchasing power, so as to provide an alternative model using a single and more 
commonly available variable. 
A similar question concerns the presence of the Laffer effect and the significance of the 
variables added in order to potentially express it. A first analysis shows that the introduction 
of the second third and fourth order expressions for the Property Tax does not seem promising 
for the general type models.  
Indeed, as for the inclusion of PTRATE
2
, i.e., as whether on models v and vi were an 
improvement vis-à-vis models i and ii, no further analysis is necessary. On model vi the 
variable is not significant when α = 1% and PTRATE becomes non-significant; and, on model 
v, the PTRATE variable is not significant when α = 1%. The addition of these variables does 
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not produce any improvement on the overall significance and power of the model, the F-
Statistics being reduced and the adjusted-R
2’s remaining both at 0.57.   
The analysis for the joint inclusion of PTRATE
2
, PTRATE
3 
and PTRATE
4
 is even more 
straightforward: all the tax rate variables become non-significant on models ix and x, the 
models’ F-Statistic’s are reduced and the adjusted-R2’s do not improve. 
 These tests show that a model based on a linear relationship between Property Tax revenue 
and Property Tax rate is the most adequate, according to our sample. Having settled the 
structure for the general model, we can now address properly the question raised by the 
unconvincing results for the purchasing power and real estate loans per capita variables. 
Does it mean we must dismiss both variables from our final general model? Not necessarily. 
Indeed, the removal of the less significant of these two variables (RELpc) immediately 
renders the PP variable unmistakably significant using the OLS estimator (cf. regression xiii, 
Table 6). However, when using the WLS estimator, purchasing power remains at best 
doubtfully significant.  
We therefore define a new equation, similar to Equation 5.1 but without the Real Estate Loans 
per capita variable. This equation will serve as a general model basis for our studies on the 
effects of competition on the following section, notwithstanding the rate-revenue model 
which we will discuss below. 
                                                                      
 (5.7) 
The results of the rate-revenue models are complex, interesting and deserve a paused analysis. 
The coefficients of the models designed to allow a classical Laffer curve do not point to the 
formation of such a curve, as a simple graphical analysis shows. These coefficients are 
moreover clearly non-significant on both model vii and model viii. 
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Graphic 1: Linear Rate-Revenue Models
 
Graphic 2: Quadratic Rate-Revenue Models 
 
However, the results for models xi and xii are not only robust, but, as Graphic 3 shows, seem 
to indicate some limited presence of the Laffer effect with a multiple-peaked Laffer Curve, 
two peaks being visible in the graphic and an hypothetical third peak that may or may not 
exist
16
 if the tax rate were greater than 0.5%. We conduct the redundant variables Test that 
confirms that the inclusion of variables PTRATE
2
, PTRATE
3
, and PTRATE
4
 is not redundant 
and improves the model, as one could already predict by the regression results, as the 
                                                          
16
 A purely mathematical extension of the curve would not point to a third peak, but the outright extrapolation of 
these results for outside the original range would be a methodological mistake.  
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introduced variables were significant and the values for the adjusted-R
2’s improved, even if 
only slightly, from 0.19 and 0.16 (regressions iii and iv) to 0.20 and 0.17 (regressions xi and 
xii). 
Graphic 3: Fourth-Degree Rate-Revenue Models 
 
If the results from the general models seem to point to a positive linear correlation between 
the tax rate and tax revenue, and if the Laffer-effect visible in the rate-revenue models is 
limited, at best, can we affirm the presence of a Laffer curve at all? In order to address this 
question, some points must be made that may help us gaining a better understanding of what 
we can or cannot find in the present study. 
First, the range of possible tax rates in this particular tax is quite restricted by national-level 
legislation, and these rates, even at their maximum level, are far from what we could consider 
confiscatory or even prohibitive levels. Obviously, one must keep in mind that although the 
rates are nominally low, the tax bases are usually high values (values of real estate property). 
Nevertheless, the range is limited and has a relatively low ceiling, which makes it very likely 
that, if the Property Tax revenue follows a Laffer curve pattern, we be still away from its 
prohibitive area.  
Second, the Laffer effect is subtle, and tends to remain so until very high tax rates are 
achieved, which is when this effect may appear clearly with devastating consequences. It 
remains relatively “hidden” when discussing low-to-moderate tax rates. 
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It is not surprising then that, in such a context and when mixed with much “stronger” 
variables – the market-driven value estimates for real property (AREV), for example –, the 
Laffer effect cannot be a major driver, and, in an overall analysis, may remain unnoticed, at 
least until the prohibitive threshold is reached.  
What the rate-revenue model can and seem to indicate at this point is that, albeit subtly, there 
is evidence of a manifestation of the Laffer effect in our sample, whose meaning we will 
discuss in detail in our conclusions. 
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6. THE COMPETITION EFFECT AND THE LAFFER CURVE 
6.1 The Quest for the Competition Effect 
In this section, we will seek to identify the potential effects of competition on the Laffer curve 
and, on more broad terms, on our models, through two complementary analyses.  
The first analysis, represented on Equations 6.1 and 6.2, relies on dummies that control for the 
levels of competition that we have assigned to each municipality; the second, which we will 
apply solely to the rate-revenue models – and expressed on Equation 6.3 – is simply a 
partitioning of the sample according to the competition levels, in order to draw and compare 
different tax rate-revenue curves for the different competition levels. 
The scope of the two analyses should not be confused. While the first is intended to confirm 
whether there is a (positive) overall correlation between competition and tax revenue – and, if 
this should be the case, the result on the rate-revenue model would be a simple shift upwards 
–; the second analysis is broader, and is indeed one of the core aspects of our study: how do 
rate-revenue curves vary according to the degree of competition? How do they compare with 
each other? Thus, although both have different purposes and meanings, the second analysis is, 
in its implications for the Laffer curve, more wide-ranging and potentially more impacting. 
                                                                
                           
(6.1) 
A simplified version of Equation 6.1 that does not include AREV as an explanatory variable 
is presented and discussed on Appendix B. 
                                       
              
              
 
                         
 (6.2) 
                                             
                
 
               
         
 (6.3) 
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On Equation 6.3, “c” represents the competitive level (Low, Average or High) of each 
municipality
17
. 
For the first analysis we will use, like we have done previously in order to obtain greater 
robustness, two estimators: OLS with White’s correction; and WLS with inverse variance, 
this time based on the RELpc variable serving as weight. The choice of this variable has a 
similar rationale to AREV, but since the former is no longer an explanatory variable, its 
adoption as weight seems methodologically more correct at this point. For the second 
analysis, and given that the weight used on the WLS estimator – in this case, RELpc – could 
place a significant restriction
18
 on the sub-samples, we will employ solely the OLS estimator. 
6.2 An Earthquake, Two Mountains? 
When focusing on the effects of competition on the tax rate-revenue relation and trying to 
discern the shape of the tax rate-revenue curves for each degree of competition, we should 
mind the possible effects of an “earthquake” which affects our sample and may influence our 
results, particularly in this analysis. This metaphorical earthquake is the already mentioned 
change of tax range for year 2012, the minimum / maximum rates changing from 0.2% / 0.4% 
to 0.3% / 0.5%. 
Can this “earthquake” change our landscape and shape two different “mountains”, i.e. two 
different tax rate-revenue curves? In what way does it affect our models?  
The question is indeed especially relevant for our discussion, since a tax rate can have very 
different meanings depending on whether it was freely and strategically adopted or whether it 
was imposed by a third-party. For example, a 0.3% tax rate has a radically different meaning 
if adopted by a municipality before 2012 – it was exactly the “central” rate in the 0.2% / 0.4% 
range – or during 2012, where the 0.3% rate became the minimum imposed by national 
legislation. 
In our estimations we will thus always consider two different time-frames: one encompassing 
all the timeframe of our sample, the other limited to 2009-2011, before the shift in the tax 
rates range. The results arising from the second timeframe can be seen as more reliable, being 
fruit of a sample established on a common basis, and thus more robust. 
                                                          
17
 Not to be confused with “1c”, the identifier for PTRATE3 in our fourth-degree equations. 
18
 The same would happen were we to adopt AREV as weight. 
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6.3 Estimation Results 
On Table 6 we present the results for the estimation, performed through both OLS and WLS 
estimators, of Equations 6.1 and 6.2 using our sample, in order to analyze the impact of the 
dummies (CDUMMY_I and CDUMMY_II) that incorporate the three distinct competitive 
levels on the models, i.e. to assess whether competition has a statistically significant impact 
on tax revenue. We present results both for the total period of the sample, 2009-2012, and for 
the period 2009-2011 (cf. section 6.2). 
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Table 6: Results for Models xiii-xviii 
Regression No. xiii xiv xv xvi xvii xviii 
Equation 6.1 6.2 
Model Type General Rate-Revenue 
Estimator OLS WLS OLS WLS OLS 
Years 2009-2012 2009-2011 2009-2012 2009-2011 
C 
-7,599.39 
*** 
-10,211 
*** 
-5491.09 
n.s. 
-8,480.97 
** 
1,570.77 
*** 
-2,994.76 
*** 
β1 
15,432 
*** 
17,301 
*** 
14,329 
*** 
16,046 
*** 
N/A N/A 
β1a N/A N/A N/A N/A 
-1,985,682 
** 
4,330,560 
*** 
β1b N/A N/A N/A N/A 
9.14E+08 
** 
-2.28E+09 
*** 
β1c N/A N/A N/A N/A 
-1.79E+11 
** 
5.24E+11 
*** 
β1d N/A N/A N/A N/A 
1.27E+13 
** 
-4.24E+13 
*** 
β2 
0.17 
*** 
-0.05 
n.s. 
0.18 
* 
-0.06 
n.s. 
N/A N/A 
β3 
-0.15 
*** 
0.91 
** 
-0.10 
*** 
0.92 
** 
N/A N/A 
β5 
0.10 
*** 
0.11 
*** 
0.10 
*** 
0.11 
*** 
N/A N/A 
β6 
3.73 
*** 
5.02 
*** 
2.68 
n.s. 
4.17 
** 
N/A N/A 
β7 
3.88 
*** 
9.28 
*** 
3.79 
*** 
9.12 
*** 
17.82 
*** 
16.35 
*** 
β8 
41.30 
*** 
37.98 
*** 
41.14 
*** 
37.78 
*** 
74.01 
*** 
72.29 
*** 
n 1,112 1,079 840 813 1,232 924 
F-Statistic 
259.08 
*** 
289.34 
*** 
195.91 
*** 
214.29 
*** 
206.51 
*** 
158.92 
*** 
Adj. R
2 0.62 0.65 0.62 0.65 0.50 0.51 
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The results for regressions xiii and xv are promising: all variables are statistically significant 
and have the expected coefficients. Even unemployment, which on previous regressions had a 
positive coefficient, suggests now the expected negative impact on tax revenue. 
Despite the significance and value of the purchasing power and unemployment variables not 
being consensual among regressions xiii and xv, on one side, and xiv and xvi on the other, an 
issue which we will address in a moment, there is a consensus regarding the most important 
result of these regressions: β7 and β8 are positive and statistically significant in all the general 
model regressions. Indeed, such a result indicates that competition does have an effect on tax 
revenue: as expected, caeteris paribus, more competitive municipalities have higher tax 
revenue. 
Regressions xvii and xviii lead us a step further, and show that competition has a similar 
effect on the tax rate – tax revenue relationship: everything else being constant, more (less) 
competitive municipalities obtain higher (lower) tax revenues. 
Graphic 4: Tax Revenue for Different Competitive Degrees 2009-2012 
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Graphic 5: Tax Revenue for Different Competitive Degrees 2009-2011
 
Regarding the differences between the general model regressions obtained through OLS and 
through WLS estimators, we believe the first to be unmistakably more reliable, as it relies on 
a larger sample, and also because the WLS estimator seems to consistently overestimate the 
revenue-tax relationship, i.e., for lower (higher) rates, tax revenue predictions are 
underestimated (overestimated) vis-à-vis the results obtained with OLS. 
In what concerns the sample period differences, i.e., the impacts of the shift of the rate range 
in 2012, the results in the general model do not present major differences, which may be 
explained by the significance of the β6 variable, i.e. the control for Year, in regression xiii in 
contrast with its non-significance in regression xv.  
Having thus considered the OLS estimator more reliable than WLS for our regressions, and 
having shown that the variable Year can adequately control for the range change in 2012, we 
adopt regression xiii as our definitive general model. On Appendix B we develop a simplified 
version of this model. 
The acknowledgement of the importance of variable Year in the general model is the key to 
understand the very different results that we obtain for the rate-revenue models depending on 
whether we include the year 2012 (regression xvii) or not (regression xviii): while the 
coefficients and representation of regression xvii point to a two-peaked Laffer curve, the 
representation of regression xviii is quite different and displays an upward slope in the highest 
rates of the range. 
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In fact, while on the general models the variable Year is capable of incorporating the 2012 
range change in the model, no such control variable exists for the rate-revenue models, 
because, due to their two-dimensional character, their segmentation is, in itself, the way to 
incorporate such changes of paradigms. We thus conclude that the “earthquake” caused by the 
change in the tax range does indeed generate two different “mountains”, two different curves, 
as we can see on Graphic 5 and Graphic 6. 
On Table 7 we have the results for the regressions of Equation 6.3 made for three sub-
samples: the LC, AC and HC municipalities, using OLS with White’s Correction, both for the 
entire period of the sample, i.e. 2009-2012, and sectioned, due to the aforementioned reasons, 
as to control for the exogenous tax range change on 2012, i.e. divided in two periods, 2009-
2011 and 2012. 
For comparison purposes, the regressions for the entire sample are also presented, including 
regression xi, which had been computed on Table 5. These later regressions are based on 
Equation 5.6. 
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Table 7: Results for regressions xix-xxix 
Regression 
no. 
xi xix xx xxi xxii xxiii xxiv xxv xxvi xxvii xxviii xxix 
Equation 5.6 6.3 5.6 6.3 5.6 6.3 
Model 
Type 
Rate-Revenue 
Estimator OLS 
Years 2009-2012 2009-2011 2012 
Sub-
Sample 
N/A LC AC HC N/A LC AC HC N/A LC AC HC 
C 
2,603.47 
*** 
732.02 
n.s. 
1,641.78 
*** 
4,466.33 
** 
-6,248,15 
*** 
-1,699.53 
*** 
226.55 
n.s. 
-51,038 
* 
-5,135,15 
*** 
20,278 
*** 
4,064.65 
*** 
28,918 
*** 
β1a 
-3,272,803 
*** 
-921,424 
n.s. 
-
2,024,155 
*** 
-
5,830,624 
** 
9,032,493 
*** 
2,424,245 
*** 
-57,291 
n.s. 
69,516,593 
* 
4,625,082 
*** 
-
23,199,970 
*** 
-4,582,700 
*** 
-
31,207,712 
*** 
β1b 
1.49E+09 
*** 
4.31E+08 
n.s. 
9.12E+08 
*** 
2.77E+09 
*** 
-
4.77E+09 
*** 
-
1.25E+09 
*** 
-
84,957,630 
n.s. 
-3.45E+10 
* 
-
1.50E+09 
*** 
9.67E+09 
*** 
1.91E+09 
*** 
1.25E+10 
*** 
β1c 
-2.87E+11 
*** 
-8.44E+10 
n.s. 
-1.75E+11 
*** 
-5.56E+11 
*** 
1.10E+12 
*** 
2.84E+11 
*** 
4.48E+10 
n.s. 
7.48E+12 
* 
2.12E+11 
*** 
-1.76E+12 
*** 
-3.46E+11 
*** 
-2.20E+12 
*** 
β1d 
2.02E+13 
*** 
5.96E+12 
n.s. 
1.22E+13 
*** 
4.04E+13 
*** 
-
9.25E+13 
*** 
-
2.37E+13 
*** 
-5.55E+12 
n.s. 
-5.96E+14 
* 
-
1.09E+13 
*** 
1.18E+14 
*** 
2.30E+13 
*** 
1.43E+14 
*** 
n 1,232 588 452 192 924 441 339 144 308 147 113 48 
F-Statistic 
76.33 
*** 
73.86 
*** 
31.36 
*** 
1.43 
n.s. 
62.28 
*** 
64.20 
*** 
24.12 
*** 
1.89 
n.s. 
18.60 
*** 
21.17 
*** 
7.38 
*** 
0.59 
n.s. 
Adj. R
2 0.20 0.33 0.21 0.01 0.21 0.36 0.21 0.02 0.19 0.36 0.19 - 
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All the regressions, with the exception of regression xxvi, hold the signs expected in order to 
form a Laffer curve, i.e. first and third coefficients are positive, second and fourth coefficients 
are negative. All regressions are globally statistically significant with the exception of those 
performed with municipalities classified as highly competitive, despite the individual 
significance of all their variables, which is in all probability due to the reduced size of the 
sub-sample.  
Graphic 6: Before and After Tax Range Change 
 
As previous results had already indicated, the shift in the tax rate change causes a shift in the 
rate-revenue curves. While the 2009-2011 regression points to the formation of a two-peaked 
Laffer curve, the results for 2012 point to rising revenue in the maximum rate, which is not 
surprising, given the nature of the tax object, i.e. tax property, and the time that taxpayers will 
take to adjust their behavior to the new tax range. 
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Graphic 7: Representations Segmented by Competitive Degree (2009-2012)
 
Graphic 8: Representations Segmented by Competitive Degree (2009-2011)
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Graphic 9: Representations Segmented by Competitive Degree (2012)
 
The rate-revenue curves represented above, especially on Graphics 8 and 9, in continuity with 
the previous findings, suggest the existence of multiple peaked – in this case, two-peaked –
Laffer curves.  
The comparison of the rate-revenue curves relative to each competitive degree shows that 
there is more than an upward shift to the Laffer curve, a shift that we proved to exist in a 
significant fashion (cf. Table 6). Indeed, the theoretical predictions presented on our 
introduction seem to be confirmed, as we found not only an upwards shift – as we had already 
seen on Graphics 4 and 5 – but also a leftwards shift: indeed, in all representations and with 
no exception, the rate-revenue lines for more competitive municipalities are at the left and 
above the lines for less competitive municipalities. 
It would follow from a shift left and upwards that the peaks for the more competitive 
municipalities correspond, caeteris paribus, to lower tax rates. That seems visible even for the 
lesser peaks, as happens in Graphic 7, where highly competitive municipalities have a first 
peak at the 0.25% rate, the average and low competition municipalities having a first 
maximum around 0.40%, while average municipalities additionally show a less relevant, very 
minor peak at the initial rate of 0.2%. A similar pattern is visible on Graphic 8, despite highly 
competitive municipalities having a single peak at the relatively low rate of 0.25%, a result 
consistent with our theory. 
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7. CONCLUSIONS 
This study is pioneer in its essence. Departing from a strong and exhaustive theoretical 
discussion, we assert the possibility of the existence of a third major driver to the Laffer 
effect, adding to the already thoroughly studied effects of (capital and labor) supply elasticity 
and tax evasion; we called it “competition effect”, as it should arise from the interactions 
proper to each market structure – as we believe that taxation can be regarded as a price, and 
states and state-like entities can be regarded as producers – the corollary being that more 
competitive environments should lead, caeteris paribus, both to higher tax revenue and, most 
importantly, to a lower equilibrium price, i.e. the peak or peaks of the Laffer curve when the 
environment is more (less) competitive should correspond to lower (higher) tax rates in 
comparison with less (more) competitive environments. 
We argued that the study of the Portuguese Property Tax could offer us an invaluable setting 
to study this issue, as the 308 Portuguese municipalities, which have the competency to set 
the tax rates (within limits defined by national level legislation) and collect the tax revenue, 
provide a large four-year (2009-2012) sample of 1,212 observations; a sample which is not 
only large, but of high-quality, as it does not have to rely on approximations – as would be 
necessarily the case if one were to use different countries with their different taxes – as the 
tax, its rules and its valuing system is exactly the same for all these municipalities. Moreover, 
the influence of the two classical drivers of the Laffer curve on the Property Tax is extremely 
limited (capital and labor supply elasticity considerations have an extremely limited scope and 
tax evasion is very difficult and hardly significant), which should facilitate the discernment of 
the hypothetical competition effect. 
On the path towards our goal, and side by side with a rate-revenue model, we developed a 
general model – our definitive version being regression xiii, obtained through Equation 5.7, 
having also developed a simplified version which is presented on Appendix B – that explains 
Property Tax revenue and which may be of practical use for the Portuguese municipalities. 
On Appendix C, we will deal with some aspects concerning the practical implementation of 
our general model in order to estimate Property Tax revenue. 
Our rate-revenue models suggest that the relationship between Property Tax rates and 
Property Tax revenue could potentially be described by a two-peaked Laffer curve, or a 
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multiple-peaked Laffer curve with two major peaks, having discarded the possibility of a 
classical one-peaked Laffer curve.  
Having classified the municipalities according to three different degrees of competitiveness 
based on geographical, infrastructural and economic factors, delimited by the profound and 
well-known Portuguese asymmetries, we proceeded to see if competition had any statistically 
significant impact on the Laffer curves for the Portuguese municipalities. 
Our results have shown that competition has a clear and significant impact on tax revenue in 
general and on the scheming of the rate-revenue relationship (e.g. through the Laffer curve) in 
particular. When competition is higher, not only the tax revenue tends to have an overall 
increase – i.e. the Laffer curve is shifted upwards – but, as we have seen, there are changes in 
the Laffer curve itself. We documented significant changes (and not only upward swifts) in 
the Laffer curves for municipalities depending on their competitive status, namely regarding 
the peaks, which, as we predicted, correspond to lower (higher) tax rates in more (less) 
competitive environments, i.e. caeteris paribus more competitive (monopolistic) market 
structures maximize revenue with lower (higher) prices. 
Given the vanguardist and innovative nature of our assertions and of our approach, many 
questions remain unanswered, up to discussion, development and improvement. One of these 
challenges is to provide a theoretical explanation for the minor peaks of the Laffer curve for 
Property Tax in our sample. Spiegel and Templeman (2004) defend a non-singular peaked 
Laffer curve with basis on high wage inequalities, which can hardly justify our findings. 
What, then, may cause the first and minor peak? Could it be a compromise between tax 
revenue maximization and the signaling of political competence, the yardstick competition 
hypothesis advanced by Costa and Carvalho (2013)?  
Furthermore, the range of possible rates for the Property Tax rate is quite limited in Portugal, 
which placed a constraint to our analysis, as we observed the phenomena filtered through a 
small window, which did not allow, for example, to see extreme manifestations of the Laffer 
effect, e.g. abrupt fall of tax revenue when prohibitive tax rates are set. Thus, a widening of 
this study could be extremely relevant, not only a widening of the sample, but also a widening 
of scope, studying, for example, the presence of competition as driver to the Laffer effect in 
other taxes, namely personal and corporate income taxes. 
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8. APPENDIX A: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS SEGMENTED BY COMPETITIVE LEVEL 
Table 8: Descriptive Statistics 
 
  
Panel A: Property Tax Revenue  per capita 
PTREVpc n Mean Median SD Max Min 
Total 1,232 75.26 60.39 53.92 356.04 17.32 
LC 588 49.60 46.95 18.45 116.72 17.32 
AC 452 74.80 68.47 36.66 247.51 18.75 
HC 192 154.94 128.51 78.15 356.04 38.54 
 
Panel B: Property Tax Rate 
PTRATE n Mean Median SD Max Min 
Total 1,232 0.35% 0.37% 0.07% 0.50% 0.20% 
LC 588 0.32% 0.30% 0.07% 0.50% 0.20% 
AC 452 0.36% 0.40% 0.06% 0.50% 0.20% 
HC 192 0.39% 0.40% 0.04% 0.50% 0.20% 
 
Panel C: Purchasing Power 
PP n Mean Median SD Max Min 
Total 1,232 76.51 70.84 22.43 232.54 47.36 
LC 588 67.85 64.50 13.55 118.65 47.36 
AC 452 77.05 74.86 18.06 144.88 47.73 
HC 192 101.77 96.40 32.16 232.54 53.93 
 
Panel D: Unemployed per 100 inhabitants 
UNEMP n Mean Median SD Max Min 
Total 1,232 14.27 13.70 3.92 29.60 5.40 
LC 588 13.62 13.10 3.95 29.60 5.40 
AC 452 14.20 13.70 3.58 24.90 8.40 
HC 192 16.40 16.55 3.86 24.80 8.80 
 
Panel E: Real Estate Loans per capita 
RELpc n Mean Median SD Max Min 
Total 1,178 6.58 5.90 3.92 39.44 1.94 
LC 540 5.58 5.24 1.97 12.94 2.60 
AC 446 6.53 6.23 2.74 21.85 1.94 
HC 192 9.51 8.36 5.74 39.44 3.23 
 
Panel F: Average Real Estate Value 
AREV n Mean Median SD Max Min 
Total 1,112 979.92 911.50 231.54 2030.00 651.00 
LC 485 856.24 839.00 130.24 1417.00 651.00 
AC 438 984.26 929.50 181.65 1742.00 691.00 
HC 189 1287.21 1291.00 249.04 2030.00 846.00 
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9. APPENDIX B: SIMPLIFIED GENERAL MODEL 
On section 4, while discussing the control variables for our general model, the first and more 
obvious variable that we brought to our discussion was purchasing power, which, given the 
non-existence of GDP per capita figures at a municipal level, was meant to be the major 
vehicle for capturing the economic and income drivers. However, the average real estate value 
variable and, on a lesser degree, the real estate loans per capita variable, seem to capture these 
drivers, to the point of threatening the joint significance of these variables, which lead us not 
to include RELpc on Equations 5.7 and 6.1. 
Since the AREV variable is not as universal and easy to obtain as purchasing power, we will 
draft a new equation  – Equation 9.1 –, based on Equation 6.2, that relies only on easy-to-
obtain variables – tax revenue, tax rate, purchasing power, unemployment and competition 
dummies –,  and perform a new regression in order to obtain a simplified version of our final 
general model. 
                                                                
                 
(9.1) 
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Table 9: Simplified Model Results 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
These results show that the simplified model is unmistakably significant, and can be helpful 
for estimating property tax revenue with few and fairly common variables. The coefficients 
are very similar to those obtained on regression xiii, which is the non-simplified version of 
this estimation, with the exception of unemployment, a variable which had contradictory 
results among our models. 
  
Regression No. xxx 
Equation 11 
Model Type General 
Estimator OLS 
Years 2009-2012 
C 
-6,169.51 
*** 
β1 
14,006 
*** 
β2 
0.66 
*** 
β3 
0.70 
*** 
β6 
3.04 
*** 
β7 
13.73 
*** 
β8 
57.89 
*** 
n 1,232 
F-Statistic 
256.73 
*** 
Adj. R
2 0.55 
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10. APPENDIX C: USE OF THE GENERAL MODELS TO PREDICT PROPERTY TAX REVENUE 
Albeit such was not the main purpose of our study, in order to test our hypothesis we have 
developed models that explain tax revenue with substantial power, with an adjusted-R
2
 value 
of 0.65 on our regression xiii and of 0.55 on its simplified version, regression xxx. Some 
cautionary notes should be made, however, before using the estimated coefficients in practice 
to predict future tax revenue, the first being that we didn’t conduct tests to assess the 
predictive power of our models, but to estimate correlations with property tax revenue, which 
is not necessarily the same thing. 
We used as the Property Tax rate variable the tax rate for the real estate valued according to 
the new Property Tax Code. However, before the general revaluation of real estate ordered by 
the Law no. 60-A/2011 of November 30
th
, which impacts, in practical terms, fiscal years 2013 
and following, there was a significant number of real estate which was subject to a different 
tax rate, applicable for real estate valued according to the rules in force before 2003. 
Since we do not have access to tax revenue discriminated by origin, i.e. corresponding to each 
of the valuing rules (and applicable tax rates) and to rural property, we cannot provide with 
accuracy a model to explain tax revenue according to each of the categories, we can only 
provide what we believe to be a reasonable approximation. Indeed, there is a very strong 
correlation between the tax rates for real estate valued according to the 2003 and pre-2003 
rules (correlation of 0.69, significant when α = 1%).  
Additionally, one should keep in mind that part of the Property Tax revenue comes from rural 
property. Since there is no discriminated data, we could not isolate that effect either, which 
for the purpose of the main objectives of our study is irrelevant, because there are no 
interactions for the rural Property Tax rate, as it is set not by municipalities but by national 
legislation.  
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